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ARTICLES
COMMUNITY PROPERTY MARITAL SETTLE-
MENTS: THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSAL
Roland L. Hjorth*
Property settlements pursuant to marriage dissolutions may involve
a multitude of tax consequences not readily apparent to the affected
parties.1 Ever since the decision in United States v. Davis,2 it has been
clear that if one former spouse transfers appreciated separate property
to the other former spouse 3 pursuant to a divorce or dissolution settle-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., University of Nebraska, 1957;
LL.B., New York University, 1961.
1. In most dissolutions the property involved may be of minor significance, and
lawyers will be more concerned with the tax consequence of post-dissolution payments
made to support one spouse or minor children. Post-dissolution payments can create
problems not only under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 71 & 215 [hereinafter cited as
I.R.C.] (periodic payments by husband to wife for support are deductible by the
husband and income to the wife unless they are specifically designated as child support),
but under id. § 141 (husband cannot claim standard deduction if he deducts periodic
payments); id. § 152(e) (husband gets dependency exemption for children if he pays
at least $600 per year child support per child and agreement or decree awards the
exemption to him); id. § 214 (wife cannot take deduction for child care payments if
exemptions for children are awarded to the husband under I.R.C. § 152(e)); and
numerous other sections. This article is concerned only with property settlements made
pursuant to the dissolution of a marriage. Very few statutory provisions are directed
specifically to the problem.
2. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
3. As used in sections 71, 152 (b) (4), 215 and 682, if the husband and the wife
therein referred to are divorced, wherever appropriate to the meaning of such
sections, the term "wife" shall be read "former wife" and the term "husband"
shall be read "former husband"; and, if the payments described in such sections
are made by or on behalf of the wife or former wife to the husband or former
husband instead of vice versa, wherever appropriate to the meaning of such sections,
the term "husband" shall be read "wife" and the term'"wife" shall be read "hui-
band."
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17).
This article makes similar assumptions. Thus, husband and wife are referred to as
spouses even if a marriage has been, or is in the process of being, dissolved. More-
over, the article assumes that if a division is unequal, the wife will receive the larger
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ment, and in order to discharge marital obligations of the transferor,
the transferor spouse will recognize a gain equal to the excess of the
market value of the property over its adjusted basis. 4 The transferee
spouse generally will recognize no income and the basis in the prop-
erty transferred will be its fair market value on the date of transfer.5
It is generally assumed, however, that these rules do not apply to
the "division" of property held by spouses as co-owners.6 Equal divi-
sions of community property are said to be nontaxable events 7 in
which the adjusted basis of the marital community in a given asset
carries over to the person to whom the asset is awarded. 8 As a result,
share; that if a division is in fact a "sale" the husband will be the purchaser; and that
a right to income will have been earned by the efforts of the husband. These assump-
tions are made for convenience only.
4. The Davis rule has been applied in Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97
(10th Cir. 1964) (husband taxed even though wife did not release her marital rights):
Matthews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (tax imposed on transfer by
wife to husband even though she had no financial responsibilities to him), Swaim v.
Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969) (husband taxable on installment note
transferred to wife as alimony). For general discussions, see Kleinbard, Matrimonial
Law-Impact on Federal Taxes, N.Y.U. 31ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1679 (1973):
Schwartz. Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 176 (1967); Barton, Current Tax Problems of Marriage and Divorce, U. So.
CAL. 1967 TAX INST. 609.
5. Rev. Rul. 221, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 63. See also Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Com-
missioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
6. In Davis, the Court carefully noted that the wife's claims to property trans-
ferred to her by her husband "do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership."
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962). The Court, therefore, did not disturb
a line of cases, beginning with Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935), holding
divisions to be nontaxable even if they are not partitions. Although the Court did
not endorse those decisions, such endorsement is implicit in Collins v. Commissioner.
393 U.S. 215 (1968). In Collins, the Tenth Circuit had rejected the husband-trans-
feror's contention that the wife had a vested property right prior to the divorce decree
and that a transfer of property to her was a nontaxable division. 388 F.2d 353 ( 10th
Cir. 1968). While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
ruled that under Oklahoma law a wife did have vested property rights prior to divorce
for Oklahoma tax purposes. The United States Supreme Court remanded for recon-
sideration in light of the state tax decision. On remand, the Tenth Circuit reversed
its prior holding since the wife's interest was a "species of common ownership."
412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969). The Internal Revenue Service also concedes that
divisions of co-owned property are not taxable to the extent that the divisions are
"equal." Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
7. Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 290 (1965).
8. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (division
of property held by former spouses as tenants by the entirety). See also John H.
Schacht, 47 T.C. 552 (1967) in which the Commissioner conceded that a partition
of stock was not a taxable event. The court held that the basis of a transferee spouse
in assets transferred severally is the "basis or cost to the community." Id. at 557. The
court added that "the Davis case is not applicable here. It concerned rights under
Delaware law, not community property rights." Id. at 558. The property in Schacht
was California community property.
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an equal property division in terms of market value can be unequal in
terms of adjusted basis. Community property settlements can never-
theless be taxable if they are unequal,9 or to the extent that they in-
volve the sale of a community property interest by one spouse for the
separate cash, 10 property or obligation" of the other spouse. And,
whether community property divisions are taxable or nontaxable, they
may present assignment of income problems' 2 that are often avoided
in noncommunity property states.
It has been forcefully argued that federal tax consequences of prop-
erty settlements should not depend upon whether the property in-
volved is separate or community property; as a matter of policy, the
tax treatment applied to community property divisions is preferable
for both types of property to the rules set forth in United States v.
Davis.'3 The rules set forth in the Davis case may, and probably
9. No cases have been found dealing with "unequal" divisions in which one spouse
did not purchase part or all of the interest of the other. Cases finding divisions to be
nontaxable have always involved divisions that were substantially equal. See, e.g.,
Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1953); Ann Y. Oliver,
8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949). Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29,
at 6, holds that an unequal division is taxable under Davis principles only to the
extent that one spouse transfers more than one-half of co-owned property to the other
spouse. In Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947), the wife was taxed
not only because she sold her interest in property to her husband but also because he
paid less than the property was worth; because payment was less than value, the
division was unequal.
10. Jean L. May, CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974) (purchase by husband of wife's
interest in California community property by use of funds borrowed by the husband).
11. Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 65 (1954) (sale by wife of about
one-half of her interest in return for note of husband held to be a taxable sale);
Maurine DeWolfe Brown, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948 (1953) (transfer of interest in
ranch to husband for his agreement to pay $150,000 held to be a taxable sale).
12. Each spouse in a community property state realizes one-half of total income
realized by the marital community. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). If such
income is recognized after the termination of the marital community and collected
by only one spouse, it can be argued that the non-collecting spouse has assigned the
income to the other spouse and should therefore report one-half the income. See
United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971) (widow taxed on her share of income
earned by deceased husband even though she had renounced her claim to such income):
[T] he wife's transfer of her interest to the husband [in a nontaxable division]
could be treated as an anticipatory assignment of the income to be realized from
services rendered by the community. In this event, the income so assigned would
be taxed to her as collected by the husband.
Victor, Divorce and Deferred Compensation Arrangements, U. So. CAL. 1972 TAX
INST. 469, 482-83.
The "innocent spouse" rule of I.R.C. § 6013(e) may alter this rule for years in
which a joint return was filed, but the statute does not apply if a joint return was not
filed. Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Barton, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property Settlement Agreements-
The Davis, Gilnore and Patrick Cases, U. So. CAL. 1964 TAX INST. 421. The American
Bar Association Section on Taxation has recommended that the result in Davis be
233
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should be, modified to reflect changes in the marital relationship and
in the underlying rights of the parties to a marriage. Davis assumes a
marital relationship that was typical decades ago in noncommunity
property states; i.e., the husband accumulated property by working
outside the home; the wife accumulated only "inchoate marital rights"
by working inside the home. 14
Recent cases have recognized that property is often acquired from
the combined earnings of husband and wife.' 5 When this occurs, the
wife's interest in property might achieve the "dignity of co-ownership"
lacking in Davis. It would be reasonable to go further and provide
that even if one spouse works only at home, such contribution to the
family wealth is substantial enough to support a family property in-
terest which achieves the dignity of co-ownership for federal income
tax purposes. One court appears to have gone nearly that far. In Imel
v. United States,16 the Davis case was held inapplicable to a transfer
of separate property by husband to wife, on the basis of a Colorado
Supreme Court certification that:17
at the time the divorce action was filed there vested in the wife her in-
terest in the property in the name of the husband ... [The] transfer
involved here was a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of
the marital estate resembling a division of property between
co-owners.... [The transfer does not] more closely resemble a con-
overruled by legislation. As a result, the transferor would recognize no gain and the
transferee would inherit the transferor's basis and holding period. BULL. SECTION OF
TAXATION A.B.A., July 1966, at 63-66. One object of the proposal is to extend the
rule that no gain or loss is recognized on an equal division of community property
"to unequal divisions as well, including those frequent situations where the husband
gets more than half of the property presently in being in return for a note or other
promise to pay future moneys." Id. at 65. By another amendment, such payments
would be income to the wife (and deductible by the husband) if they are made over
a period of more than 10 years and are not specifically identified in the decree or writ-
ten instrument as being "for the purchase of property rights owned by the wife before
the divorce." Id. at 62.
Treasury Department proposals in 1969 also recommended that the transfer of
appreciated property pursuant to a divorce settlement not be a taxable event and that
the transferee assume the transferor's basis. The proposal says nothing about com-
munity property. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TAX REFORM
STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 343 n.6 (Comm. Print 1969).
14. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. III (1930).
15. See, e.g., Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1972) (where both
spouses were employed, payments by husband on behalf of wife held to be payments
for a property interest rather than periodic payments subject to rules of I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215).
16. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9459 (D. Colo. 1974).
17. Id.
234
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veyance by the husband for the release of an independent obligation
owed by him to the wife ....
Although Imel does not inspire confidence, 18 one may nevertheless
expect that property settlements in noncommunity property states will
eventually be governed by the rules that apply to divisions of commu-
nity property. Regrettably, however, the "rules" governing community
property divisions do not comprise a coherent body of law. Some-of
these difficulties, which will be discussed in this article, include: (1) It
is not clear why a spouse who receives assets in a nontaxable division
should, as the general rule requires, take as an adjusted basis in each
asset the adjusted basis held by the marital community. It would seem
more logical and practical to award to each spouse one-half of the
aggregate community basis and allocate that basis among assets re-
ceived in proportion to their values. 19 (2) What may appear to be an
equal division of community property may in fact be a taxable sale, as
where the community owns one asset which is awarded to one spouse
who gives the other a promissory note in an amount equal to one-half
the value of the asset.20 (3) It is not clear how "equal" a division must
be in order to be nontaxable. Divisions that are taxable because they
are unequal raise difficult questions concerning the amount of gain to
be recognized and the resultant adjusted basis of property received. 21
(4) A division involving an assignment of a right to income may not
be taxable in the year of division, but may lead to post-division tax
consequences that are intolerable.22 The cases do not indicate the ex-
tent to which traditional assignment of income principles should be
applied to accounts receivable, installment obligations, pensions, and
so forth. These problems have developed chiefly as a result of the
failure of courts to deal with isolated problems as part of a larger
whole. In short, courts have generally been required to answer only
one question in each case involving community property divisions and
18. The court's opinion leaves open the possibility that the filing of a divorce
action may be deemed a taxable event. The decision would have rested on firmer
ground if the Colorado Supreme Court had instead certified that the property held in
the husband's name was a "species of co-ownership" even before the divorce action
was filed.
19. See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 62-68 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 81-86 infra.
22. See Parts V-A,-B &-C infra.
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have not shown an exceptional awareness of the implications of each
decision.
This article is an attempt to deal with the "larger whole" of
community property divisions. It concludes with a proposal that,
inasmuch as marriages in community property states are similar to
partnerships, the dissolution of marriages should be treated for tax
purposes in a manner similar to the dissolution of partnerships.
I. A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF
BASIC PRINCIPLES
United States v. Davis has been the subject of intensive analysis,
comment and criticism. 23 It is reviewed here only to show that com-
munity property settlements often result in tax consequences that are
precisely the opposite of those in settlements involving transfers of
noncommunity property.
At one time, a typical family in a noncommunity property state
might have included a wife who worked only in the home and a hus-
band who earned income outside the home. All income was that of the
husband, notwithstanding the domestic labors of the wife, and all
property accumulated during marriage became the property of the
husband. 24 The wife had no property. She was entitled, however, to
support during the marriage and to a portion of her husband's estate if
she survived him.25 The wife had a claim against the husband for
these inchoate marital rights lost by reason of dissolution of the mar-
riage. The husband might satisfy these claims by making periodic
payments (alimony), by means of a property settlement, or by some
combination of alimony and property settlement. In Gould v.
Gould,26 the United States Supreme Court held, on the basis of
23. See notes 4 & 13 supra.
24. It has been said that the early common law "embodied the basic concept that
in marriage the husband and wife were merged into one and, in effect, the husband
was that 'one.'" W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 2, at 4 (2d ed. 1971). The husband became the owner of the wife's movable
property and of her earnings. The same authors note that, as a result of various
married women's property acts, spouses in common law states are regarded as separate
persons. Id. at 5.
25. See generally Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Com-
missioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
26. 245 U.S. 151 (1947).
236
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the statute then applicable, that periodic payments were neither de-
ductible by the husband nor income to the wife. As a result, the tax
burden for the payments made to a wife pursuant to a divorce fell ex-
clusively on the husband.
In 1942, Congress responded to Gould by establishing a framework
under which the tax burden for interspousal payments could be trans-
ferred from the former husband to the former wife.27 These provi-
sions, now codified as Sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (the Code), provide that "periodic payments" made by
the husband to the wife pursuant to a written separation agreement or
a decree of dissolution or separate maintenance, are deductible by the
husband as an itemized personal deduction and are income to the
wife.28 These rules do not apply, however, to lump sum property set-
tlements29 or to installment payments of an ascertainable lump sum
unless the installment payments are to be made over a period of more
than 10 years from the date of the decree.30
If one assumes that Gould still applies, except to the extent it has
been modified by Sections 71 and 215, then it is clear that the tax
burden on a transfer by husband to wife should fall on the husband
where these two sections do not apply. For example, the payment of a
27. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); 1942-2 CuM. BULL.
427; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 568; Welford E.
Garner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 353 (1973).
28. Periodic payments are not deductible by the husband and are not income of
the wife, however, if they are specifically designated as being "for the support of
minor children of the husband." I.R.C. § 7 1(b). The designation must be specific and
cannot be inferred. A payment of $200 per month, reducible to $100 per month when
a child becomes 21, is not a payment for child support. See Commissioner v. Lester,
366 U.S. 299 (1961); Betty Lou Nelson, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 356 (1973) (apply-
ing Lester, payment of $475 per month, reduced by $137.50 per month when each of
two minor children became emancipated and by another $200 per month when the
wife remarries, held not to be child support).
29. Alimony "in gross" is not deductible. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-392, 1973 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 39, at 8; Gordon D. Oxford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1973)
(payment of $4,000 in lump sum not deductible by husband even though it was not
paid for property interest of wife); William M. Hardy, 59 T.C. 857 (1973) (husband
who agreed to pay alimony until former wife's remarriage, and to then pay her a
lump sum of $5,000, could not deduct lump sum payment).
30. I.R.C. § 71(c). Installment payments made over a period of less than 10
years can be deducted by the husband (and reported as income by the wife) if they
are subject to some contingency, as where they terminate on the death of either spouse
or upon the remarriage of the wife. Rev. Rul. 72-133, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 25. Com-
pare George B. Kent, 61 T.C. 133 (1973) (payments of $600 per month for 59
months held nondeductible where not subject to contingencies in agreement or decree
or under Arizona law).
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lump sum of cash by husband to wife is not a "periodic" payment,
and, in a noncommunity property state,31 is neither income to the wife
nor deductible by the husband. It follows that if the husband sells
appreciated property and transfers the proceeds to the wife, the hus-
band is taxed on the gain and the wife receives the proceeds tax-free.
It is only logical to conclude, as did the Court in Davis, that if the
husband transfers appreciated property to the wife, he should be simi-
larly taxed on the gain. The wife has no income and her basis in the
property is its fair market value on the date of transfer.32 In short, the
transfer results in a taxable gain, and the tax burden falls upon the
transferor.
Davis can be interpreted to require that all tax burdens in a non-
community property state be borne by the spouse who earns the income
(if the item involved is a right to income such as an account receiv-
able)33 or by the spouse who owned the property prior to its inter-
spousal transfer (if the item involved is property or a right to collect
proceeds from the sale of the property).34 If any of these items is
transferred from one spouse to the other pursuant to a marriage disso-
lution, it passes to the transferee free of any tax burden unless a statute
specifically provides otherwise. Thus, payments to a wife are taxable
to her only if they are alimony; the transfer of appreciated (or de-
preciated) property to the wife is treated as a taxable event in which
the husband must recognize gain (or loss) 35 and the wife takes a basis
equal to the market value on the transfer date. "Income items" trans-
ferred to the wife, such as accounts receivable and installment obliga-
tions, will likewise be taxed to the husband.
In a community property state these same principles can be applied
3 1. In a community property state, the transfer of a lump sum of cash could
cause the wife to recognize a taxable gain if the cash payment is deemed to represent
a transfer of her community property interest. The husband takes no deduction but
the payment may affect his basis in property. See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
32. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 63.
33. This conclusion follows ineluctably from the decision in Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930). The earner would be taxed at the time of collection even if the
transfer were not a taxable event. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
34. This conclusion follows only if the transfer itself is considered a taxable event,
as it was in Davis. If the transfer were considered to be a gift, the wife would take
the property with the husband's adjusted basis and would, therefore, take it subject
to any tax burden attributable to unrealized appreciation. See I.R.C. § 1015; Taft v.
Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
35. This assumes the loss is otherwise deductible under I.R.C. § 165.
238
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to achieve what may appear to be contrary results. Income is still
taxed to the person who earns it, but in a community property state
each spouse is deemed to earn half the income,3 6 and the wife will be
taxed on one-half the income from accounts receivable even if they are
awarded to the husband-and vice versa.37 Similarly, gain from
community property sold during marriage on the intailment basis
should be taxed equally to each spouse, regardless of who collects the
payments, because gains are taxed to the owner of property and each
spouse owned half the property when it was sold.38 Equal divisions of
community property upon dissolution are not taxable events because
the transfer does not necessarily permit one spouse to obtain property
free of a "tax burden." It is necessary that the transferor husband rec-
ognize gain in a noncommunity property state because the transferee
wife recognizes no income and obtains a stepped-up basis. She obtains
no stepped-up basis in a community property state and assumes a po-
tential tax burden; the tax can, therefore, be postponed but not
avoided.
II. NONTAXABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
NOT INVOLVING SPECIAL ITEMS39
Long before the United States Supreme Court decided Davis, the
Board of Tax Appeals had held that equal divisions of community
property are not taxable events even though each spouse exchanges an
36. Poev.Seaborn,282 U.S. 101 (1930).
37. Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
38. The court in Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403, 428-31 (1949),
reaches a contrary result (gain from accounts receivable awarded to husband taxed to
him), but does not discuss the issue raised in the text.
The respective rights of the spouses to community property on dissolution vary
from state to state. All community property states start with the presumption that
each spouse is entitled to one-half the community property upon divorce, but divorce
courts can, to a greater or lesser degree, change* an equal division into an unequal
one. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 277, at
514-17 (2d ed. 1971). In Arizona, Texas and Washington, statutes authorize the
court to divide community property in such proportions as it deems just. In Idaho,
property must be divided equally except in cases where the divorce is "granted on the
ground of adultery or extreme cruelty." In the remaining states property must be
divided equally. Id. at 515. These variations in state laws should not cause different
tax consequences since all start from the premise that community property is co-owned
in equal shares by the spouses.
39. These special items include unequal divisions, settlements that involve sales,
assignments of rights to income, and assumptions of indebtedness.
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undivided one-half interest in all assets for a complete interest in only
part of the assets.4 0 Even though Davis did not apply to community
property divisions, it raised serious doubts about the precedential
value of prior decisions dealing with community property divisions.41
It was clear, however, that even after Davis, if the marital community
was divided such that each spouse received one-half of each commun-
ity asset, the division would not be taxable. 42
In a true partition of one asset or of fungibles, each co-owner be-
gins as the owner of an undivided partial interest in the whole, and
ends up with the complete ownership of only a part of that same asset
or those same fungibles-as where tenants in common of a parcel of
land divide the land into two parcels of equal size and value. Precise
partitions are rare, however, in property settlements accompanying
dissolution. A typical marital community owns a wide variety of as-
sets. Each spouse may begin with an undivided half interest in each
asset, but will end (after the dissolution) with the complete ownership
of some assets and no interest in others. One could therefore, argue,
after Davis, that even in equal divisions, each spouse "exchanges" his
or her interest in assets awarded to the other spouse in return for the
other spouse's interest in assets awarded to him or her. One could fur-
ther argue that absent a nonrecognition provision, all gains realized
on these exchanges would be taxable.43 This argument has never been
adopted; it has not even been formally advanced.
40. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). In Waz, community property was
valued at $92,000; the wife received property (worth S10,650) and her husband's
note for $35.350, thus rendering the division "equal" (S46,000 each). Today the
transaction might well be considered a sale by the wife. See, e.g., Jean L. May. 33
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974).
41. The American Bar Association at one time was concerned that "the division
of community property incident to a divorce or legal separation is thrown into chaos
by the apparent determination of the Internal Revenue Service to reexamine rules
thought settled, all because of Davis." BULL. SECTION OF TAXATION A.B.A., July 1966.
at 65. If there has been any re-examination, the Service has been remarkably quiet
about any results.
42. John H. Schacht. 47 T.C. 552 (1967). "This partition, as respondent concedes.
was not taxable. The basis to Elizabeth [the wife] of the 97.18 shares assigned
to her was the basis or cost to the community of $100 per share." Id. at 557 (citation
omitted).
43. In an "item theory" community property state this approach would be
theoretically correct. Before dissolution each spouse has an undivided one-half interest
in each asset owned by the community. This undivided interest in all assets is exchanged
for a complete interest in some assets. Thus, there is a "sale or exchange" to which
no nonrecognition section of the Code applies. See I.R.C. § 1002. It is doubtful,
however, whether any community property state adheres strictly to the "item theory."
In the divorce context, the item theory seems to be limited to the rule that items of
240
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A second possible result, plausible before and after Davis, is that
community property owned by husband and wife is partnership prop-
erty. Under this argument, one-half of the aggregate adjusted basis of
community property would be allocated to each spouse. Cash would
be included in community property adjusted basis at its face value. On
division, an ex-spouse would recognize no loss and would recognize
gain only to the extent that cash (or its equivalent) is received by that
ex-spouse. Under this argument, few divisions would be taxable, but
basis adjustment would be necessary in most.44 This second possibility
is the result advocated in Section VI of this article. It has not been
advanced by the Internal Revenue Service or accepted by the courts.
A third possible result, again plausible before and after Davis, is
that a division of community property is not taxable if it is "equal."
Each spouse takes as his or her basis in property awarded to him or
her the adjusted basis of the marital community in that property. 45
This solution has been adopted by the tax court in "equal divisions" of
community property.46 The Supreme Court and the Internal Revenue
Service have also implied that equal divisions of community property
are not taxable events, even if each spouse exchanges a one-half in-
terest in all assets for a complete interest in half the assets.47 Where
divisions are not taxable, lawyers need not be concerned with nonrec-
ognition provisions48 that might otherwise apply, or with the fact that
property not specifically allocated to one spouse or the other will be held by them
after termination of the marital community, as tenants in common. Cross, The
Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 818 (1974). The
"aggregate" theory seems more appropriate in the dissolution context. Under the
"aggregate" theory, a partition of the whole community (some assets going to one
spouse and other assets to the other) is just as much a partition as is a partition of
each individual asset owned by the community.
44. No support for this proposal has been found in the case law, even though it
would necessarily follow from treating a marital community like a partnership. See
I.R.C. §§ 731-32; Part VI infra.
45. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
46. See., e.g., John H. Schact, 47 T.C. 552 (1967); Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1965). If, however, divisions are unequal, the Commissioner takes
the position that the division is taxable to the extent of the inequality. See Part III-A infra.
47. See Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968); Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974
INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6; note 6 supra.
48. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (nonrecognition of gain on "like kind" exchanges).
Interestingly, application of the basis carryover provisions applicable to § 1031 would
lead to a division of aggregate basis rather than a carryover of community basis in
each asset. Thus, if two assets, each worth $100, but with respective bases of zero and
$100, are divided so that the husband receives the zero basis asset and the wife the
$100 basis asset, each spouse would, if § 1031 applied, end up with a basis of $50.
See § 1031(d).
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divisions might give rise to gain on appreciated assets but to nonde-
ductible losses on depreciated assets held for personal use. 49 Neither
precedent nor policy indicates that "equal divisions" should be tax-
able, unless special items50 are involved or unless one spouse in effect
"cashes out."5 1
If, in fact, the rule is that equal divisions of community property
can never be taxable events, it necessarily follows that the basis of a
spouse in each asset awarded to him or her will be the same as the
adjusted basis of the community in that asset, and will not be one-half
the aggregate community basis. Tax avoidance would otherwise be
possible because a spouse could obtain an increase in basis in certain
assets without recognizing any gain. This conclusion is best illustrated
by an example.
Assume that husband and wife own as community property cash of
$100,000 and assets with a basis of zero but a market value of
$100,000. Wife receives the cash and husband the assets in a property
division. The basis of the wife in the cash cannot be less than
$100,000. In order to prevent tax avoidance, it is necessary to rule
either: (1)(a) The aggregate community basis is $100,000; (b) the
wife's share of that basis is $50,000; (c) she, therefore, realizes a gain
of $50,000 on the division; and (d) the husband's basis in the assets
awarded to him is $50,000 (one-half the aggregate community basis);
or, (2)(a) The division is tax-free; (b) the husband's basis in the assets
is zero; and (c) the wife's basis is $100,000. While there appear to be
no cases which consider the problem of basis when one spouse receives
nothing but community cash,52 some courts have held that the second
49. The courts have apparently not addressed the question of whether a transfer
of depreciated property, for which a loss deduction would be allowed but for the
provisions of I.R.C. § 267, is deductible. The question is moot in a division that is
not a taxable event. In the author's opinion, the Internal Revenue Service should rule
that a taxable sale or exchange pursuant to the dissolution of a marriage is not subject
to I.R.C. § 267 if the parties are in fact divorced by the end of the year. See I.R.C.
§ 153. Application of I.R.C. § 267 to such situations serves only to trap the unwary
and cause prudent spouses to make transfers after, rather than before, dissolution of
the marriage.
50. See note 39 supra.
51. One spouse "cashes out" when he or she receives cash from the other spouse
for whatever interest the former has in the community assets.
52. Dictum in Maurine De Wolfe Brown, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948 (1953).
suggests, however, that a division of property in which one spouse receives all the
community cash is not taxable. In that case, the husband's purchase of his wife's
interest in a community property ranch was held a taxable sale. The court stated:
We do not have a mere division of community interests in the ranch . . . . Nor
was this a case in which the community property consisted of the ranch and a
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alternative applies when each spouse receives property.53 Those cases
suggest that the division described above would be nontaxable; it was
not a transfer in satisfaction of a wife's marital rights, but an equal
division. If the husband's basis is to be zero, he assumes a tax burden
which is simply postponed. Thus, it would be unfair to tax the wife.
These rules are simple to apply and allow a division to be nontax-
able even if one spouse "cashes out" so long as the cash itself is com-
munity property. But they create several problems. First, the rules can
work an inequity on uninformed taxpayers. Spouses who receive prop-
erties of equal value may, unknowingly, receive properties with dis-
parate tax burdens.54 Second, the rules may encourage unequal divi-
sions. An informed taxpayer who receives low basis property may
demand and receive somewhat more than half the community prop-
erty in order to compensate for the disparate tax burden. A recent
Revenue Ruling indicates that such a division is taxable to the extent
of its inequality. 55 Third, the rules create potential for tax avoidance.
A "sale" by one spouse of his or her interest for the separate cash or
separate obligation of the other spouse is a taxable event even though
the division may appear to the uninformed to be equal. Thus, if the
only asset is property worth $100,000, but with a basis of zero, a sale
by the wife of her interest to the husband for his separate obligation
(incurring a debt) of $50,000, will cause the wife (as transferor) to
recognize a gain of $50,000 and the husband (as transferee) to in-
crease his basis in the asset by that amount. 56 Such taxation is
avoided, however, if the debt is incurred before, rather than as part
of, the dissolution. Assume in the example above that community as-
sets consist of property worth $100,000 (basis of zero), subject to a
large amount of cash and in which it was agreed that the total property would be
severed in such manner that the husband would keep the ranch and the wife
would keep the cash.
Id. at 952.
53. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Ann Y.
Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949). See also Swanson v. Wiseman, 61-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9264 (D.C. Okla. 1961); Herbert A. Cook, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1405 (1969).
54. If one spouse receives only cash and the other nothing but a low basis asset
pursuant to a division, the tax on the sale of that asset will be borne entirely by the
latter.
55. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6; see, e.g., Rouse v.
Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1947) (division taxable not only because
it was a sale, but also because wife "parted with an interest in that community that in
quantity and estate was equal to that of her husband but for less than one-half its
value and less than she would have been entitled to had the property merely been
divided .....
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community debt of $50,000, and cash of $50,000. If the wife receives
the community cash and the husband the property subject to the debt,
a simple application of existing basis rules would indicate that the di-
vision is nontaxable. Thus, the existing rules encourage spouses to
borrow money in anticipation of a dissolution so as to avoid taxation.
Finally, the rules concerning basis carryover are inconsistent with the
principle that each spouse bears one-half the tax burden that accrues
to the community property.57
To avoid these difficulties each spouse should be awarded one-half
of the aggregate community basis in a nontaxable property settlement.
Under this approach, a division would be taxable only to the extent
that the cash received by one spouse exceeds his or her share of aggre-
gate community basis. For this purpose, the assumption by one spouse
of a community debt should be treated as a distribution of cash to the
other spouse in an amount equal to one-half the debt.5 8
III. TAXABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS-SALES
A. Sale or Unequal Division?
A community property settlement is taxable to the extent that it is a
sale59 or, as a recent Revenue Ruling indicates,' ;0 to the extent that a
56. The most recent case supporting the conclusion that the wife is taxed on this
kind of "sale" is Jean L. May, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974). A pre-Davis case
to the same effect is Jessie Lee Edwards. 22 T.C. 65 (1954). Cases of this sort are
numerous. They may reflect the fact that many lawyers who handle dissolution
proceedings are not tax experts. These lawyers are aware of the general rule that
equal divisions of community property are not taxable and often incorrectly assume
that a division is equal if one spouse receives all the assets and agrees to pay the other
spouse an amount equal to one-half the value.
For authority that the husband can increase his basis by the gain recognizable by
the wife, see Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949).
57. Under existing law, if all community property were sold one day before the
divorce, each spouse would be taxable on half the total gain, even if a joint return
were not filed. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). It remains unexplained why the
result should be different if the property is sold one day after the marriage has been
dissolved. For example, if the community assets consist of S10,000 cash and zero
basis property worth $10,000, a sale before dissolution causes each spouse to recognize
a $5,000 gain. Id. However, if the husband receives the property in a nontaxable
division pursuant to dissolution, and the wife receives the cash. the entire gain on the
later sale of the property will be taxed to the husband. Beth W. Corp. v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
58. See Part VI-D infra.
59. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
60. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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property division is "unequal." Early cases seem to use the two terms
interchangeably, 61 but the concepts are distinct and should be distin-
guished. In an unequal division of property, there is a taxable event
because property is transferred in discharge of a marital obligation.
The property transferred is the amount by which the total amount
awarded to the wife exceeds one-half of the total community property.
This "excess" is presumably transferred to discharge a marital claim
of the wife. In contrast, when a sale is involved, the community prop-
erty settlement is taxable, not because property is transferred to dis-
charge a marital obligation, but rather because the wife has sold her
own property for cash.
B. Sales that Result in Equal Divisions
Early cases appear to have held sales not to be taxable if they had
the result of creating an "equal division." In Francis R. Walz, 6 2 com-
munity property was valued at about $92,000. The wife received
community property worth $10,650 plus the husband's promissory.
note in the amount of $35,350, thus receiving $46,000 in total value,
or one-half the value of the community property. The husband re-
ceived all other community property (presumably worth $81,350,
subject to the wife's claim). The Tax Court held that the transaction
was not taxable because the division was "equal. '63 Subsequent cases
indicate, however, that even these "equal" divisions are taxable if one
spouse sells some or all of his or her community property to the other.
For example, in Jean L. May,64 the principal item of community
property was a residence valued at $400,000. The husband (an archi-
tect who used the residence as a showplace) was awarded the house
and agreed to pay the wife $200,000, which he borrowed. The divi-
sion was thus "equal" in the sense that the wife received $200,000 and
the husband received property worth $400,000 subject to debts of
$200,000, but the wife was nevertheless taxed on the sale. Presumably,
61. See, e.g., Frances R.Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 719. See also Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856(1953) (wife received over $500,000 in cash in return for her interest in community
property-not clear where cash came from; division held nontaxable).
64. 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974). See also Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d
706 (5th Cir. 1947) (husband's basis after a taxable purchase from wife reflected
the purchase price).
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the husband's basis in the house was stepped-up to reflect the purchase
price arrived at for settlement purposes. Although Mrs. May "cashed
out," the transaction would have been just as much a sale, and a tax-
able event, if she had instead transferred her interest in the house to
the husband for his separate promise to pay.
The May case does not indicate whether the assumption of a com-
munity debt by one spouse is a "sale" or is rather part of a "division."
We have seen that a division in which one spouse receives all the
community cash and the other receives assets can be nontaxable. 65
Conversely, a "division" in which one spouse retains all the property
and agrees to pay the other one-half the value thereof is a taxable
sale. 66 The assumption of a community debt by one spouse seems to
fall between these two factual situations. Clearly, the assumption by
one spouse of a debt incurred in contemplation of dissolution should
be treated as a taxable sale by the other spouse. Indeed, one might ar-
gue that any assumption of a community debt by one spouse is a sale
by the other spouse even if the debt is not incurred in contemplation
of dissolution. If the husband "buys" the wife's property by giving
her his separate promise to pay, he would also appear to "buy" prop-
erty when he gives the community creditor his separate promise to pay
the entire community obligation.
But taxation is a practical matter, and, in practical terms, it would
be disastrous to say that one spouse "sells" to the other in any division
involving the assumption by one spouse separately of a former com-
munity debt, because so many marital communities own property sub-
ject to debts. In most settlements involving such property, one spouse
receives the property and assumes or takes subject to the mortgage.
These divisions are probably not taxable.67 Thus, if the debt was not
incurred in contemplation of the marriage dissolution, the spouse
whose debt is forgiven should be treated as having received commu-
nity cash in an amount equal to one-half the debt. 68
65. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
66. Maurine De Wolfe Brown, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948 (1953). See also Ben
C. Land, 61 T.C. 675 (1974).
67. No case has been discovered which discusses this issue.
68. These same rules should apply even if the parties only agree, as between them-
selves, that one spouse shall pay the debts or if one spouse takes property subject to
a former community debt. The creditor might, in such a case, be able to hold both
spouses liable on the debt, but it should be presumed that the obligor will pay. For
corporate tax analogies, see I.R.C. §§ 31 1(c) & 358.
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We have thus far assumed that a settlement is either a taxable
"sale" in its entirety or a completely nontaxable division. Dissolution
settlements, however, are seldom so tidy. In many community prop-
erty settlements some assets may be divided and others sold, as where
there are three assets of equal value, with one awarded to the hus-
band, the other awarded to the wife and the third awarded to one
spouse who agrees to pay the other spouse an amount equal to half
the value of the asset. Despite a commentator's statement that in 1967
the Commissioner adopted the administrative practice of "treating a
division as taxable in full to both parties when any element of pur-
chase and sale is present, '69 there is little evidence of such a practice.
In fact, several recent cases suggest that a settlement will be a taxable
event only to the extent that items are purchased and sold.70 If so,
taxpayers may be able to reduce taxes by specifying precisely which
assets are divided and which are sold. To illustrate, assume that a
husband and wife own, as community property, the following assets:
Asset Adjusted Basis Value
House $ 40,000 $ 60,000
Yacht 50,000 60,000
Business 20,000 60,000
Total $110,000 $180,000
If the wife receives the house and $30,000 of cash borrowed by her
husband, and the husband receives the yacht and the business, there
are probably two events for tax purposes: a nontaxable division of two
assets (the house and the business) and a sale by the wife to the hus-
band of her interest in the third asset (the yacht). If the house and the
business are "divided equally" (i.e., house to wife and business to hus-
band) and the wife sells her interest in the yacht to the husband as
69. Barton, Current Tax Problems in Marriage and Divorce, U. So. CAL. 1967
TAX INST. 609, 624 [hereinafter referred to as Barton].
70. These cases involve the issue of whether the husband's payments are deductible
"periodic payments" (I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215) or are installment payments reflecting the
purchase by the husband of a property interest of the wife. See, e.g., Ben C. Land, 61
T.C. 675 (1974); Edith M. Gerlach, 55 T.C. 156 (1970). These cases do not decide
the issue discussed in the text; no case directly in point has been discovered. How-
ever, Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1965) seems to support a dual
treatment. Wren involved a division in which the Commissioner attempted to
treat a sale of stock as a taxable event. Also involved in the decision was a house
awarded to the wife. In ignoring the award of the house, the Commissioner seems to
have assumed that a settlement can be part taxable sale and part nontaxable division.
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suggested, her gain will be considerably less ($25,000) than if the house
and the yacht (instead of the business) are divided and the wife's in-
terest in the business (instead of the yacht) is sold for $30,000
($20,000 gain). 71 If the parties wish to reduce immediate gain, the
separation contract can probably effect such a reduction by providing
that the yacht, rather than the business, is being sold. Such provisions
may be repugnant to the notion that tax consequences should not de-
pend on form rather than substance, but it is difficult to prescribe
more satisfactory results under existing rules.
Results can be even more untidy when one asset is partially divided
and partially sold, as commonly occurs when there are several com-
munity assets with one worth more than all the rest combined. As-
sume, for example, that husband and wife own as community prop-
erty the following assets:
Adjusted Basis Value
Miscellaneous $20,000 $ 40,000
Business 50,000 100,000
Total $70,000 $140,000
Assume further that the wife is awarded the miscellaneous property
and $30,000 of cash borrowed by her husband. At least four mutually
exclusive results are possible: (1) Considered in its entirety, the settle-
ment is more in the nature of a nontaxable division than a taxable sale
or exchange; or, (2) Considered in its entirety, the settlement is taxa-
ble, so that the wife exchanges her interest (adjusted basis of $35,000)
in the community for cash and property equaling $70,000 and, there-
fore, recognizes a gain of $35,000; or, (3) The wife has sold her in-
terest in the business (adjusted basis of $25,000) for $50,000
($30,000 in cash and $20,000 in kind) and, therefore, recognizes a
gain of $25,000; or, (4) The wife has exchanged $20,000 (40 percent)
of her interest in the business for her husband's interest in the miscel-
laneous property in a nontaxable division. She has also sold the re-
71. This results because the adjusted basis in the yacht is higher than that in the
business. In the first instance (sale of the yacht), the wife sells her interest of $25.000
(one-half the community adjusted basis) for $30,000, realizing a gain of S5.000. In
the second instance (sale of the business instead of the yacht), the wife sells her in-
terest of $10,000 (one-half the community adjusted basis) for S30.000 and rea-
lizes a gain of $20.000.
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maining 60 percent of her interest in the business (basis of $15,000)
to her husband for cash of $30,000 and, therefore, recognizes a gain
of $15,000. It would appear that the first two possible results would
not be adopted because the courts are reluctant to adopt an "all or
nothing" approach.72 The third result is a "clean" one which a court
might well adopt. The fourth result is not as clean but just as feasible;
a court would probably rely on the language of the agreement or de-
cree to determine whether the wife has sold all or only a part of her
interest in the business. The separation contract could state explicitly
that the wife is to receive the house and that the husband is to receive
40 percent of the business by way of "equal division," and that the
wife is to sell her half of the remaining 60 percent of the business to
the husband for $30,000. Although a provision of this type might not
be binding on the Government, it seems likely that, in the present state
of confusion, it would be accepted.
C. Taxable Sales and Periodic Payments
Sections 71 and 215 of the Code provide a mechanism by which
the tax burden attributable to current payments pursuant to a dissolu-
tion can be shifted from the husband to the wife.73 Compliance with
these provisions permits the husband to deduct the payments and re-
quires the wife to report them as ordinary income. Such payments do
not effect either spouse's basis in community property. A taxable sale
by the wife of her interest in community property has quite different
results: The income of the wife is limited to actual or imputed in-
terest 74 plus other gain (capital or ordinary); the husband can deduct
only actual or imputed interest, increasing his basis in property by
the amount of gain realized by the wife.75 The parties to such a tax-
72. Cf. note 58 supra. The possibilities are mentioned, however, because they are
possibilities. There appears to be no decision which discusses the issues presented by
the illustration.
73. Under I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215, periodic payments by the husband to the wife for
support are deductible by the husband and income to the wife unless such payments
are specifically designated as child support.
74. See Gerlach v. United States, 74-I U.S. Tax Cas. 9425 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (hus-
band entitled to deduction for imputed interest under I.R.C. § 483 on payments for
wife's interest in property). The imputed interest rules of I.R.C. § 483 do not apply,
however, if payments are not for property and are not deductible by the husband be-
cause they are installments of a lum sum payable over a period less than 10 years.
Fox v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9358 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
75. Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1947).
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able sale might well prefer to come within the ambit of Sections 71
and 215, thereby giving the husband a current deduction rather than
an increase in basis. It is clear, however, that Sections 71 and 215 do
not apply to periodic payments made to purchase a wife's interest in
community property, even if the literal requirements of those sections
are met.7 6 Sections 71 and 215 apply only to payments made for the
wife's support; they do not apply to payments made for her property77
and may not even apply to payments made for marital rights other
than support.78 Taxpayers cannot alter tax consequences by labelling
payments for property "alimony," when they are not such, in fact.
Whether a given payment is a payment for support rights or a pay-
ment for property rights can, however, present difficult factual issues.
Some taxpayers attempt to exploit these difficulties. A blatant example
of exploitation is a dissolution agreement or decree reciting that the
value of the community property is zero, but requiring the husband to
make perodic payments, when the value of the community property is
in fact substantial and the periodic payments are in fact designed to
compensate the wife for her interest in that property. It is not difficult
to imagine more sophisticated schemes, such as where the wife ac-
tually receives some property but where the property awarded to her
is overvalued (or the property awarded to her husband is undervalued)
in such a manner that she appears to receive one-half the total com-
munity property (but does not in fact), and she receives additional
payments for "support" that in fact compensate her in part for a prop-
76. Ben C. Land, 61 T.C. 675 (1974).
77. Walter H. Weiner, 61 T.C. 155 (1973) (payments reflected purchase of wife's
separate property). See also George C. De Smyter, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 402
(1973); Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1972); Michael N. Lambros,
30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 585 (1971). But cf. Nancy Cole Miller, 32 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 570 (1973) (installment payments totalling $52,000 for wife's interest in joint
property deductible by husband and income to wife because she did not "contribute"
to the cost).
78. The Regulations state that installment payments are deductible only if they
"are in the nature of alimony or support." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d)(3)(i)(b)(1957).
Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966) and Soltermann v. United
States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959), indicate that even if payments would otherwise
qualify as installment payments payable over a period of more than 10 years, and
even if they are not payments for a property interest of the wife, they are not de-
ductible under I.R.C. § 215 unless they are in the nature of alimony or support. The
requirement that payments be in the nature of "alimony or support" should, in the
author's opinion, be interpreted to mean any payments other than payments for a
property interest of the wife.
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erty interest. Less sophisticated, but more difficult to unravel, are ar-
rangements by which a wife receives payments that are designed both
to compensate her for a property interest and to pay her additional
support, as, for example, where the value of her interest in community
property is $5,000 and she receives periodic payments of $15,000,
but no property.
A claimed deduction for current payments should be disallowed to
the extent the payments are made for the wife's interest in community
property. The primary issue in cases involving such claims, and as-
sumed in the schemes noted above, is the respective values of the
items awarded to each spouse.79
Both ethics and good judgment require that the parties make an
honest evaluation of each item of property and that payments made
for the wife's property be specifically designated as installment pur-
chase payments.80
79. Although the Internal Revenue Service will seldom challenge a deduction
claimed under § 215 unless the wife fails to report the income under § 71, there is
little reason why the wife should report income under § 71 if the payments received
by her are not alimony in fact. If she reports no periodic payments as income under
§ 71, the Service is bound to challenge the wife and the husband.
The difficulty of valuing such items was illustrated in A. J. Roberts, 33 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 750 (1974). The wife in Roberts received the family home and miscella-
neous other property, and the husband received the family business. A property settle-
ment agreement provided that the wife should also receive "Two Hundred Dollars($200.00) per month for a period of ten years and two months, which payments
shall be property division and not support or alimony ...... The agreement
also provided for the payment of alimony ($100 per month) and child support ($100
per month). The husband nevertheless attempted to deduct the monthly payments
stated to be by way of "property division" and was successful. The Tax Court found
that the wife had received one-half the value of the community property in assets other
than the installment payments.
80. Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 685 (1973), also indicates the necessity of accurate-
ly stating whether payments are or are not for property. In Hesse, the husband
stated that he would "give one-half million dollars to be rid" of his wife. She took
him at his word and negotiated a settlement in which she received that amount over a
period in excess of 10 years. The payments were held to be taxable to her as alimony
even though the amount was fixed and not subject to termination on her remarriage or
the death of either spouse.
Hesse and A. J. Roberts, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1974), discussed at note 79
supra, should not obscure the fact that agreements are usually negotiated with the
deliberate intention of giving a deduction to the payor and that the problem is usually
to prove that the payments were not for property, rather than vice versa. See Ben C.
Land, 61 T.C. 675 (1974); Edith M. Gerlach, 55 T.C. 156 (1970). See also George
C. De Smyter, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 402 (1973); Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 795 (1972). But cf. Michael N. Lambros, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 585 (1971).
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IV. TAXABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS-
UNEQUAL DIVISIONS
It has been stated that "the concept of equal division will be applied
in the absence of an absolutely equal division."8 1 If the inequality is
nominal or if it arises because of an honest mistake in valuing prop-
erty, it will probably be ignored. A deliberate misrepresentation of
values in a separation contract, however, so as to give the appearance
of equality when inequality is known to exist, could subject the parties
to criminal penalties as well as to tax liability; e.g., the husband may
retain property known to be worth $25,000 and the wife retain prop-
erty known to be worth $75,000, when the assets awarded to each are
valued at $50,000 in the separation agreement. The false statements
in the separation agreement may amount to a wilful attempt to defeat
or evade a tax and result in criminal penalties. 82 Such a division
would probably be taxable even in absence of fraud, as where one
spouse, in order to obtain the divorce, consents to the misstatement of
values without intending to avoid tax.83
The problem can, of course, be even more refined. Few items of
property have an exact market value. If the assets awarded to one
spouse are valued at the high end of a permissible scale, and the assets
awarded to the other are valued at the low end of a permissible scale,
with each spouse receiving one-half the assets so valued, the division is
probably not taxable. 84 Where the division does not purport to be
equal, but where the inequality is the result of the larger tax burdens
assumed by one spouse, as where the recipient of low-basis property
81. Barton, vtupra note 69, at 623 (emphasis added).
82. See I.R.C. § 7201; Legatos v. United States, 222 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1955).
83. In finding a settlement to be a sale, Judge Raum of the Tax Court noted in
Maurine De Wolfe Brown, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948, 952 (1953). that "the so-
called property agreement . . . represented merely the best bargain that [the wife]
could drive in the circumstances." In unequal division cases the spouse who will often
pay the tax will be the one in the weaker bargaining position. The results ma
seem harsh, but the fact is that one who accepts less than half the community prop-
erty in a community property state generally does so for a reason; such a spouse is
willing to pay in order to obtain a divorce. Spouses who pay cash are taxed on that
cash as it is earned and it is difficult to see why those who pay with property should
fare better.
84. Apparently, however, some courts are willing to become parties to valuation
battles. See e.g., A. J. Roberts. 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1974).
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receives more than half the community property, the division should
not be taxable.8 5
These considerations demonstrate that the threshold question of
whether the division is "equal" is not easily answered. The paucity of
litigation may simply mean that unless the disparity is obvious, tax-
payers generally treat the "division" as nontaxable and the Internal
Revenue Services does not intervene. Some of the problems presented
by unequal divisions are treated in a recent Revenue Ruling which
represents the Tax Commissioner's first attempt to set forth rules
in this difficult area. Thus, it merits close examination.
In Rev. Rul. 74-347,86 a husband and wife had, by their combined
efforts (both had been employed), acquired jointly-owned property
worth $70,000; the husband acquired separate property worth
$40,000. The marriage was dissolved in 1973 and the wife was
awarded assets worth $55,000, all of which had been jointly-owned
property. The Commissioner found that the wife had a property in-
terest only in the jointly-owned property ($70,000) and that her in-
terest therein was worth $35,000. The excess joint property awarded
to her (worth $20,000) was a taxable transfer in which the husband
exchanged his interest in jointly-owned property in order to free him-
self of his Wife's claim against his separate property.
In sum, the Commissioner treated the joint property as if it were
first equally divided ($35,000 to each spouse) and then $20,000 of the
husband's interest in such property was transferred to the wife in dis-
charge of a marital obligation. The amount realized by the husband as
a result of this transfer was $20,000. The husband's basis in the prop-
erty transferred was determined by a complex formula which may be
distilled as follows: (1) Ascertain the total adjusted basis of assets
awarded to the wife by totaling the basis of each item awarded to the
wife; (2) Subtract from the result in (1) the amount by which the ad-
justed basis of assets for which losses are not deductible exceed the
value of such assets to determine the "modified adjusted basis" in as-
sets received by the wife; and (3) Multiply the "modified adjusted
85. To treat such divisions as taxable would raise administrative difficulties notjustified by any substantial increase in revenue. In essence, a de minimis rule should
be applied.
86. 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
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basis" by a fraction, the numerator of which is the net value of "ex-
cess" property awarded to the wife and the denominator of which is the
net value of all property awarded to the wife.
In Rev. Rul. 74-347 the adjusted basis of property awarded to the
wife was $29,500, but this included personal furniture with a basis of
$4,000 and a value of $2,000. "Modified adjusted basis" of assets
awarded to the wife was therefore $27,500. Because the value of "ex-
cess" joint property awarded to the wife was $20,000 and the value of
all joint property awarded to her was $55,000, the basis of the hus-
band in the "excess" property transferred was ($20,000- $55,000) x
$27,500, or $10,000. The husband therefore recognized a taxable
gain of $10,000.
Rev. Rul. 74-347 apparently does not permit the parties to desig-
nate which assets go into the "excess" portion transferred to the wife.
If such designation were possible, the parties might first divide the as-
sets equally, then specify which assets awarded to the husband are to
be transferred to the wife in payment of marital obligations. Thus,
taxpayers could reduce taxes by designating high basis assets as the
assets transferred in payment of marital obligations. In such a case the
wife's basis in the assets transferred in payment of marital obligations
would be the market value of those assets at the time of transfer. To
illustrate, assume that husband and wife own jointly the following as-
sets:
Asset Adjusted Basis Value
A $ 10,000 $ 50,000
B 20,000 50,000
C 30,000 50,000
D 40,000 50,000
Total $100,000 $200,000
Assume further that the wife is to receive three assets worth a total of
$150,000. Before Rev. Rul. 74-347, the parties might first have
awarded to the wife Assets A and B and to the husband Assets C and
D. The husband might then have transferred Asset D to the wife in
payment of a marital obligation, giving the husband a taxable gain of
$10,000 and giving to the wife a basis of $50,000 in Asset D. Rev.
Rul. 74-347 seems to assume this cannot be done. In the example
given, the total adjusted basis (before modification) of property re-
ceived by the wife is $70,000 (assets A, B and D), the value of "ex-
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cess" property received by the wife is $50,000 and the value of all
property she receives is $150,000. Under Rev. Rul. 74-347, the hus-
band's basis in "excess" property transferred to the wife is presumed
to be one-third of $70,000, or $23,333. His recognized gain is there-
fore $26,667, and the wife's basis in her assets should be correspond-
ingly increased. The Ruling, however, does not indicate how the in-
creased basis is to be allocated to the respective properties received by
the wife.
It is submitted that the Ruling is incorrect with respect to calcula-
tion of the husband's gain and the wife's adjusted basis in the property
transferred. Under the Ruling, the Commissioner has adopted an "item-
by-item" approach in determining the wife's basis in assets before
the adjustment and a kind of "aggregate" approach in determining
the amount of the husband's gain. Under a pure "item-by-item" ap-
proach, the parties could designate which assets are the "excess"
assets transferred to the wife and basis adjustments would be made
only on those assets. Under a pure "aggregate" approach, the aggre-
gate basis would be allocated in accordance with value. The basis in
''excess" property transferred could then be determined in accordance
with the following formula: basis in excess property transferred bears
the same ratio to total basis as the value of excess property trans-
ferred bears to total value. After the husband's gain is computed, it
is added to each asset received by the wife in proportion to the value
such asset bears to total value of assets received.87 Either a pure
item-by-item approach or a pure aggregate approach is preferable to
that taken in Rev. Rul. 74-347 because either approach, applied con-
87. Thus, in the preceding example, each of the four assets would have a basis
equal to one-half its value, or $25,000, since the aggregate basis ($100,000) is equal
to one-half the aggregate value ($200,000). Under the formula suggested:
basis of excess property (X) value of excess property
aggregate basis aggregate value
X $ 50,000
$100,000 $200,000
X = $25,000
Husband's gain now equals $25,000 [$50,000 (value) less $25,000 (adjusted basis of
excess property)]. Total value of assets (A, B & D) received by the wife equals
$150,000. The value of each asset ($50,000) accounts for 113 of the total value re-
ceived by the wife. Thus, her basis in each asset is increased by $8,333 (1/3 of
$25,000) to $33,333 ($25,000 + $8,333).
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sistently, clearly allocates the increased basis to the respective
properties received by the wife.
Rev. Rul. 74-347 makes it clear that the Internal Revenue Service
now acquiesces in the proposition that an "equal division" of
co-owned property pursuant to a dissolution of marriage is not a tax-
able event. By referring to "net fair market values," the Ruling also
suggests that property subject to indebtedness can be divided on a
tax-free basis. Moreover, the Ruling assumes that the basis of assets
awarded to each spouse in a nontaxable division is the same as the
pre-dissolution basis in that property, thus implying that ostensibly
"equal" property divisions in which one spouse receives cash only (so
long as the cash was the joint or community property of the spouses
prior to dissolution) can be nontaxable.
In Rev. Rul. 74-347 the husband surrendered an interest in jointly
held property in order to free his separate property from his wife's
marital obligation claims. 88 One might therefore argue that the Ruling
does not apply to an unequal division of community property unless
there is also some separate property involved in the settlement. If there
is no separate property, a husband who receives less than half the com-
munity property could claim that he receives nothing for the excess
property transferred by him, because he has no separate property sub-
ject to his wife's claims. However, there is little merit to such an argu-
ment. The husband could receive something of value in an unequal
community property division, such as a release or reduction of his
wife's claims to his post-dissolution earnings and property. Certainly
there is no indication that Mr. Davis (in United States v. Davis) could
have avoided tax by transferring everything he had to his wife. 89
V. ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME PROBLEMS IN TAXABLE
AND NONTAXABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
A. General
Although the preceding discussion is concerned primarily with com-
munity property, it also applies to marital settlements in which any
88. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
89. The Court in Davis assumed that the husband had received value for the
transfer of property to his wife equivalent to the value of that property. See text ac-
companying note 2 supra.
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joint or common property interests are divided or sold. Assignment of
income problems, however, are almost unique to community property
jurisdictions. In a noncommunity property state, if the spouse who
has earned a right to receive income retains that right, the other spouse
will not be taxed when the earner collects the income. The earner is
also taxed even though he transfers the right of collection to the other
spouse. 90 In neither event is the spouse who did not earn the income
taxed.
Results in community property states are different because each
spouse is entitled to share equally in the income earned and gains de-
rived by the community.91 It follows that if one spouse is awarded a
right to receive earned income in a nontaxable property settlement,
the other spouse will nevertheless be treated as having earned one-half
the income and will be taxed on that one-half when it is collected by
the other spouse. 92 This assignment of income principle can arise in
many contexts. Some obvious instances include: (1) Accounts receiv-
able earned by cash basis taxpayers during the existence of the marital
community but not collected until after the community is terminated;
(2) Vested and contingent rights under qualified pension plans earned
during the existence of the marital community but not collected until
the post-dissolution retirement or death of the employee;93 (3)
Amounts receivable under installment contracts, the gain on which is
reported as amounts are paid by the debtor under Section 453 of the
90. Albert Hurwitz, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 2011 (1964) (earner of noncommu-
nity property taxed in the year of transfer, where he assigned rights to personal ser-
vice income to his wife pursuant to the dissolution of their marriage).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), where the Supreme
Court held a Louisiana widow liable for tax on one-half the income earned by her
deceased husband even though she had renounced any claim to such income. See also
Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760 (1974).
92. This assumes, of course, that the income was earned during coverture. When
a marital community terminates may be difficult to determine because something less
than divorce or dissolution can terminate it in some jurisdictions. See Knodle v.
Warren, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9261 (W.D. Wash. 1966)(community terminated when
spouses separate and by agreement or otherwise manifest an intent to dissolve the
community). Although a community can terminate before dissolution, the parties
may file a joint income tax return if they are not in fact divorced at the end of the
tax year. For general discussion, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T. OF THE
TREASURY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE INCOME TAX, PUB. 555 (1973).
93. For discussion of such pension plans, see Note, Disposition of Military Re-
tired Pay Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 50 WASH. L. REV. 505 (1975).
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Code; and, (4) Items subject to investment credit and depreciation
recapture rules. 94
If these assets are partitioned, with one-half ultimately payable to
each spouse, the partition is not taxable and each spouse will report
his or her proportional share as collected. But in most cases the in-
come items will go to one spouse in return for property awarded to the
other. The questions raised are whether the division is itself taxable
and, if it is not, who should bear the tax burden when the income is
eventually collected.
B. Accounts Receivable of Cash Basis Taxpayers
If a wife "sells" her interest in community property accounts receiv-
able for the separate property or separate obligation of the husband,
she will be taxed on her half of the income at the time of sale.95 In
such a sale, the wife's basis in the consideration received (if other than
94. See I.R.C. §§ 47, 1245, 1250 & 1251. These recapture items are discussed in
Part VI infra. As to investment credit recapture, the court, in Frank R. Hammerstrom,
60 T.C. 167 (1973), held that a conversion of community property into property
held by former spouses as tenants in common does not trigger investment credit re-
capture. The decision implies, however, that a wife who transfers her interest in "sec-
tion 38 property" (certain depreciable property for which an investment tax credit is
granted) in exchange for her husband's interest in other property is subject to the re-
capture rules of I.R.C. § 47. See also Rev. Rul. 390, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 2 (although
surviving spouse receives stepped-up basis in her share of community property under
I.R.C. § 1014(c)(6), she is still subject to investment credit recapture rules if the
property is sold even though the interest of the decedent is not subject to these rules).
The exchange of an interest in Section 1245 (and other depreciable) assets should be
subject to recapture rules in an otherwise nontaxable exchange if the transferee's ad-
justed basis in such property is in any way modified because of the exchange. See
Rev. Rul. 487, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 165 (conversion of automobile to personal
use not a "disposition" under I.R.C. § 1245, but the statute will be applied to any
disposition at a later date).
95. See, e.g., Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974), in which
a wife received some assets and cash in a "division" of community property. In addi-
tion, she received her husband's separate note of $10,000 "in payment for" accounts
receivable of the husband (community property under Texas law) in the amount of
$10,910.40. The wife was held to have realized $5,455 in the year of "sale" to her
husband. Presumably, the husband had to account for only $5,455.
Showalter is unfortunately typical in the questions it leaves unanswered. Thus, if
the wife received a note of $10,000, why is her income limited to one-half the ac-
counts receivable? If the note is for something other than her interest in accounts re-
ceivable, one wonders why no gain or loss on the sale of the other item is not con-
sidered. Perhaps the excess payment is really a lump sum payment for the wife's sup-
port, not includable in her income and not deductible by the husband.
Perhaps rough justice is all that can be expected in these cases, but even rough jus-
tice should be articulated. The Internal Revenue Service seems to take the position
258
Community Property Marital Settlements
cash) will be the amount reported as income on the sale plus her share
of community basis, if any, in the accounts. 96 But the mere fact that a
division involves accounts receivable does not render it taxable. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated in Johnson v. United States
97
that a division in which one spouse receives all accounts receivable
and the other spouse receives other community assets in return is non-
taxable. In such a nontaxable division, each spouse will, of course,
nevertheless report one-half the income from the accounts receivable
as it is collected, regardless of who collects it. To illustrate, if the only
assets are (1) accounts receivable with an adjusted basis of zero and a
value of $20,000 and (2) a house with a basis of $10,000 and a value
of $20,000, an award of the accounts to the husband and the house to
the wife would be nontaxable. The wife, however, will recognize
$10,000 of income when the accounts are collected by her husband. 98
Because existing rules have no sound logical base, the collateral tax
consequences of the wife's recognition of income are impossible to
predict with confidence. For example, in the illustration just discussed,
the husband reports $10,000 income from the accounts receivable.
The wife reports $10,000 income also but should be able to increase
her basis in the house from $10,000 to $20,000. Such a basis step-up,
however, could result in a loss of tax revenue because $20,000 of in-
come is taxable in any event and would not, absent divorce, lead to a
step-up in basis. One could argue alternatively that the husband
that tax will not be imposed in the year of sale (but rather when payment is made)
if hardship would otherwise result. See Rev. Rul. 471, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 10.
But cf. Realty Loan Corp., 54 T.C. 1083 (1970); Charles Sorensen, 22 T.C. 321 (1954)
(wife does not qualify for installment sale provisions on sale of pension rights be-
cause such rights are not "property" for tax purposes).
96. Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974) illustrates difficulties
that can arise in this area. The Tax Court assumes that the taxpayer's adjusted basis
in the accounts receivable was their face value, rather than the amount reported by
her as income. If the excess of face value over adjusted basis represented only a
payment in discharge of marital obligations (rather than a purchase of other prop-
erty), the conclusion is correct.
97. 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
98. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940). See also United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). In Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), the Supreme
Court held that income is taxed to the person who earns it. The earner cannot shift
the tax to someone else by assigning the right to receive that income to someone else.
In Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Court elaborated on Lucas in holding
that in a community property state, the husband and the wife each "earn" one-half
the income earned by the other. Accordingly, a wife who relinquishes her right to
collect income earned during the existence of the marital community (and therefore
earned by her) will be taxed on it.
259
Washington Law Review
should recognize a capital gain of $10,000 when he transfers the
house to the wife, but in such a case he would bear the entire tax
burden attributable to the appreciation of the house.
To amplify, the illustration shows $10,000 potential capital gain in
the house awarded to the wife and $20,000 potential ordinary income
in the accounts awarded to the husband. United States v. Mitchell9 9
indicates that each spouse should eventually recognize $10,000 of
ordinary income and $5,000 of capital gain. Thus, the wife should
recognize $10,000 of ordinary income upon collection of the notes
and have an adjusted basis of $15,000 in the house. The husband
should recognize a capital gain of $5,000 when the house is trans-
ferred to the wife (he has sold his interest in the house) and should
recognize ordinary income of $10,000 when the notes are collected.
This result would be inconsistent, however, with the rule that an equal
division is not taxable even if accounts receivable are awarded to one
spouse. Thus, none of these results are entirely acceptable and there is
apparently no case or revenue ruling which adequately considers the
dilemma.1 00
In any event, separation contracts should be drafted in such a
manner that accounts receivable are either partitioned or sold by one
spouse to the other in a taxable sale. To allocate the accounts to one
party in a nontaxable division will almost certainly impose hardship
on the spouse who surrenders his or her rights in those accounts.
C. Retirement Benefits
Retirement benefits, whether in the form of interests in qualified
pension and profit sharing plans, 10 ' or in nonqualified plans, may
often be the single most valuable asset of a marital community. A pre-
liminary question that should be asked in these cases is whether non-
vested pension rights should be considered community property for
federal income tax purposes. Lucas v. Earl'0 2 holds that income is
99. 403 U.S. 190 (1971), discussed at note 91 supra.
100. It is possible, but not certain, that this result was adopted in Johnson by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court's opinion does indicate that the
husband would recognize some gain in this example but does not indicate the ef-
fect on the wife's basis in property.
101. I.R.C. §§ 401-04.
102. 281 U.S. Ill (1930).
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taxed to the person who earns it, even if the right to collect the income
is transferred to someone else. The court held in Poe v. Seaborn10
3
that one-half the income earned by a husband in a community prop-
erty state is in fact "earned" by the wife and should be taxed to her. It
seems to follow that a husband's retirement benefits, if awarded to
him in a nontaxable exchange, will be at least partially taxable to the
ex-wife when the ex-husband collects those benefits. But if the retire-
ment benefits are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture until after
the marriage is dissolved, e.g., the rights are forfeited if the employee
resigns without cause,' 0 4 it can be argued that none of the benefits are
in fact earned until the marriage has been dissolved and that no bene-
fits should be taxed to the nonemployee spouse. Although the question
remains unresolved, it would seem proper to hold that retirement ben-
efits which are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture are not com-
munity property for federal income tax purposes.' 0 5 If so, many divi-
sions considered to be equal under state law may not be equal for fed-
eral tax purposes. 0 6
It seems clear, however, that if a wife sells her interest in vested re-
tirement rights to her husband for his cash or separate property, the
sale is a taxable event. At least one court has also held that a wife,
who withdraws her one-half community interest in a qualified profit-
sharing fund maintained by her husband's employer, recognizes ordinary
income to the extent of the withdrawal. 07 But one commentator has
103. 282U.S. 101 (1930).
104. For treatment of some of these plans, see I.R.C. § 83. Even qualified plans
may remain unvested for a period of time. See Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974, 8A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1 (Sept. 2, 1974).
105. See Note, Disposition of Military Retired Pay Upon Dissolution of Mar-
riage, 50 WAsH. L. REV. 505 (1975).
106. To illustrate, if a husband and wife own property with a basis of $10,000
and a value of $20,000, and if that property is awarded to the wife in return for her
release of claims against the husband's forfeitable retirement benefits (which he con-
siders to be worth $20,000), the division, which the parties consider to be equal, may
be unequal because the husband has received "no property" for federal tax purposes
and, therefore, must recognize a gain of $5,000. The husband surrenders (sells) his
one-half interest in the property (basis $5,000 and value $10,000) in return for the
wife's release of her claims against the retirement benefits and, therefore, must recog-
nize the $5,000 gain. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
107. Bussey v. United States, 71-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 9314 (W.D. Tex. 1970). The
taxpayer in Bussey apparently failed to argue that the transaction should be treated
as a nontaxable division of community cash. Instead, she argued only that the pro-
ceeds should have been taxed to her as long term capital gains. The Service has ruled
that there is no "disposition" when stock purchased by the husband with community
property funds through the exercise of a qualified stock option is divided equally be-
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suggested that equal divisions involving the transfer of an interest
in vested pension rights are nontaxable. 10 8 In such nontaxable divi-
sions, the wife is presumably taxed on part of the pension when it is
collected. The commentator provides, as an example of a nontaxable
property division involving vested retirement rights, a marital com-
munity owning a pension right with a basis of zero and value of
$100,000, cash of $50,000, and stock with a basis of $10,000 and
value of $50,000. Pursuant to divorce, the husband received the pen-
sion and the wife received the cash and stock. The commentator con-
cludes that the wife would have no income upon the division but that
she would report half the pension as income as it is collected by the
husband. 109
These presumed tax consequences of nontaxable divisions of pen-
sion rights are, however, unrealistic and unreasonable. An ex-wife is
not likely to report any part of her ex-husband's pension after he re-
tires. Retirement might occur 10 to 30 years after divorce. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that she would know how much to report even if she
were aware of the law and wanted to report the proper amount of
income. Finally, if she predeceases the husband, the tax she might be
liable to pay cannot be paid by anyone. Her obligation to pay a tax in
the future is not, after all, income in respect of a decedent." 10
Divisions involving transfers of vested retirement benefits should be
taxed in the year in which the division takes place or, if not taxed.
should by legislation be treated as the separate property of the em-
ployee spouse for federal income tax purposes.11 '
tween the spouses pursuant to a divorce decree. Rev. Rul. 74-278, 1974 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 24. at 9.
I.R.C. § 401(d)(4)(B). as amended, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 § 2001(h)(I), 8A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 160 (Sept. 2. 1974). provides
that, in the case of self-employed retirement plans. "no benefits in excess of contribu-
tions made by an owner-employee as an employee may be paid to any owner-em-
ployee, except in the case of his becoming disabled . . . prior to his attaining the age
of 59!2 years." It is therefore possible that a sale by one spouse of her interest in such
a plan to the other spouse will disqualify the plan in a community property state. A
nontaxable division in which one spouse releases her interest in the plan for the in-
terest of the other spouse in community property may be similarly hazardous.
108. Victor, Divorce and Deferred Compensation Arrangements, U. So. CAL.
1972 TAX INST. 469.
109. Id. at 482-83. It can be argued that the husband recognizes a gain of S 15,000
in the year he "exonerates" his pension. Johnson v. United States. 135 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1943).
110. See I.R.C. § 69 1(a).
I ll. In any event, taxpayers are entitled to more certainty than now exists. The
Commissioner should publish guidelines dealing with this problem. The federal trea-
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D. Rights Under Installment Contracts
Property divisions involving transfers of community property inter-
ests in accounts receivable and in vested pension (and similar) rights
create special problems because these items are not "property" for
federal tax purposes. They represent rights to income earned by the
marital community properly taxable one-half to each spouse. Gains
from installment contracts representing income realized by the com-
munity, but not reported until after dissolution, are similar to ac-
counts receivable and pension rights in these respects and present sim-
ilar problems. 112 One might, therefore, expect installment contracts to
be treated like accounts receivable. In Ann Y. Oliver, however, the
court treated an installment contract like any other community "prop-
erty."' 113 In Oliver the husband received the right to collect on an in-
stallment contract in a nontaxable division. The tax court ruled that
the husband assumed the basis of the community in the contract.
Thus, he was taxed on all the installment income even though it was
"realized" while he was married to his former spouse. The court ap-
parently did not consider whether the former wife should have been
taxed on one-half the income. Oliver is the only case in this area and
is of dubious precedential value.
E. A Caveat
The preceding discussion assumes that nontaxable property divi-
sions involving transfers of rights to earned income cannot operate to
sury could lose substantial revenue when and if employee spouses report only a frac-
tion of their pension income on the theory that the remainder should be taxed to an
ex-spouse.
112. One might argue that any disposition of an installment obligation is a tax-
able event, even in an equal division pursuant to dissolution, because I.R.C. § 453(d)
indicates that any disposition of an installment obligation is taxable unless the disposi-
tion is specifically exempted from taxation by that section. No cases which consider
this question have been discovered.
113. 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403, 428-31 (1949). In Oliver, a husband and wife
sold Texas community property on the installment basis for $1,500,000. The commu-
nity basis in the property sold was slightly over $40,000 and the sale occurred in
1941. Divorce occurred in 1942, the husband was awarded all rights in the contract
in a division assumed to be "nontaxable." The Commissioner wanted to reduce the
husband's basis in the property by one-half, but the court ruled that the husband
received the entire community basis in property awarded to him in a nontaxable divi-
sion. The court thus assumed two doubtful propositions without discussion: (1)
that there was no taxable disposition; and (2) that the wife should not be taxed on
half the income.
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shift the tax on the earned income from one spouse to the other. How-
ever, as we have seen, assignment of income principles are not applied
to divisions involving transfers of rights under installment contracts,
and their application to divisions involving transfers of pension rights
would lead to intolerable and unrealistic results. Parties to a dissolu-
tion settlement should be aware that it is entirely possible that a court
in the future will refuse to apply these principles to divisions by which
rights in accounts receivable are transferred. It would be more equi-
table and practical to tax the income from accounts receivable to the
person who collects that income, regardless of who earned it, unless a
division involving accounts receivable is taxable to the extent such
accounts are transferred, as suggested below.
VI. A PROPOSAL
A. General
Statements to the effect that equal divisions of community property
are not taxable events are incomplete at best: they do not address the
ancillary tax consequences (e.g., post-division adjusted basis in indi-
vidual assets) of nontaxable property divisions; they do not define
what is meant by "equal division"; they do not distinguish "divisions"
from "sales"; and they do not consider the unique problems presented
by divisions involving rights to earned income and other items. The
development of decisional law in this area has been understandably
haphazard; a court in a given case is seldom called upon to decide
more than one issue.1 14 Thus, as we have seen, community property
divisions present many issues not yet faced by any court. The resulting
lack of coherence and predictability is understandable but regrettable.
Comprehensive guidelines should be promulgated. 115 Although courts
114. If the issue is whether one or both spouses should pay a tax because of the
division, a court is not necessarily required to decide what the adjusted basis of each
spouse in property should be after the division; if the issue is whether accounts re-
ceivable awarded to one spouse should be taxed in part to the other spouse, a court
may not be required to decide what effects its decision will have on the adjusted basis
of other property awarded to each spouse. Moreover, a decision involving a nontaxable
division of property other than cash may be of little relevance to an equal division
in which one spouse receives his or her entire interest in cash.
115. Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Service apparently has abandoned its at-
tempts to promulgate comprehensive guidelines dealing with community property mari-
tal settlements. Instead, protection is to "be achieved by the spouses entering
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would not be required to follow such guidelines, guidelines would
make a court more aware of the implications of its decision on issues
not immediately before it and would contribute to a more orderly
development of the law.
As a general proposition, the tax consequences of property settle-
ments made pursuant to the dissolution of marriages should be based
upon the nature of the marital relationship. Although a marital rela-
tionship in a community property state may not qualify as a partner-
ship under state law or the Uniform Partnership Act, it is more closely
akin to a partnership than any other entity or quasi-entity recognized
by the Code. 116 Moreover, the Code already contains detailed rules
governing the dissolution of partnerships and the sale of partnership
interests. 117
For instance, it is a general rule that a partner must recognize gain
on the dissolution of a partnership only to the extent that cash re-
ceived exceeds his adjusted basis in the partnership. 118 His adjusted
basis in assets received on dissolution is determined by reference to his
basis in the partnership, reduced by any cash received pursuant to the
into an agreement with the District Director relative to such community property par-
tition providing that the overriding intent is to divide the community-property assets
equally by value." BNA TAX MANAGEMENT MEM. 71-23, at 11 (1971). I.R.C. § 7121
authorizes the "Secretary or his delegate" to enter into closing agreements with tax-
payers. Closing agreements affecting returns to be filed must be approved by the As-
sistant Commissioner (Technical). 26 C.F.R. § 601.202(c)(2) (statement of proce-
dural rules).
The author does not believe that the District Director has the authority to enter
into the kind of agreement described by Tax Management, Inc. Taxpayers who enter
into agreements with District Directors relating to current or future tax years cannot
rely on such agreements. Emma R. Dorl, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 692 (1973), affd
74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9826 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 1974).
116. And there is no escape from the fact, however much some may cavil at
it, that it [the community systeml was viewed there [in Spain] as being in the
nature of a partnership between the spouses. . . . It is difficult to see how it can
be considered in any other light, for it represents the right to share equally in
the acquests and gains of the spouses during the marriage as well as liability for
the obligations incurred on behalf of the community, usual attributes of a part-
nership.
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 95, at 236-37.
(2d ed. 1971). Professor Cross has stated that the "community property system may
be regarded as a type of partnership," adding that though such spouses "are not
possessed of the rights and liabilities of ordinary business partners," each spouse is
regarded as contributing equally to and sharing equally in the economic well-being of
the marital enterprise. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 729, 733-34 (1974).
117. I.R.C. §§ 731-55.
118. I.R.C. § 731(a).
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dissolution. 119 There are also special rules which apply to sales of
partnership interests 120 and to dissolutions and sales involving unreal-
ized receivables and appreciated inventory.1 2 1 These rules, 122 with
appropriate modifications recognizing unique problems presented by
marital partnerships, may be profitably applied to property settle-
ments made pursuant to marriage dissolutions in community property
states.
B. Ascertaining the Adjusted Basis in the Marital Community
A member of a formal partnership knows that his or her adjusted
basis in the partnership is not necessarily the sum of his or her propor-
tionate share of the partnership's basis in each asset it owns; it is
rather the algebraic sum of a given partner's adjusted basis in property
he or she contributed to the partnership,1 23 plus partnership income
taxed to that partner, plus his or her share of partnership indebted-
ness, less prior tax deductions claimed, and less prior distributions.1 2 4
The adjusted basis of a spouse in a marital community cannot usually
be ascertained in such a formal manner for obvious reasons. However,
a very close approximation can be made by ascertaining the sum of
the community's basis in each asset it owns (including cash) and di-
viding the result by two. The result is each spouse's adjusted basis in
the marital community. To illustrate, if a husband and wife own (1) a
house with an adjusted basis of $30,000 and a value of $50,000, and
(2) cash of $50,000, total adjusted basis is $80,000 and the adjusted
basis of each spouse in the marital community is $40,000. If the hus-
band receives the cash and the wife the house in an equal division
pursuant to dissolution of the marriage, the husband recognizes a cap-
ital gain of $10,000 since he has in effect "cashed out" his interest in
the partnership. The wife has no gain and her adjusted basis in the
119. I.R.C. § 732(b).
120. I.R.C. § 741.
121. I.R.C. §§ 735 &751.
122. The detailed rules relating to partnership dissolutions and sales are readily
available elsewhere and are not discussed in this proposal. For a discussion of part-
nership taxation, see, e.g., A. WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION (1957).
123. I.R.C. § 722.
124. I.R.C. § 705. The assumption of liabilities is considered to be a contribution
of money to the partnership. I.R.C. § 752.
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house is increased from $30,000 to $40,000 to correspond to her
basis in the prior partnership. If the second asset in the above example
were, instead of cash, a security with a basis of $40,000 and a value
of $50,000, the division would be nontaxable and each spouse's ad-
justed basis in property awarded to him or her would be $35,000.125
If this formulation is accepted, it would require several modifica-
tions, the first of which would account for unique problems presented
by property the sale of which gives rise to a nondeductible loss. Such
property may be referred to as "nondeductible property."
C. Basis Modifications for "Nondeductible Property"
Most marital communities own some assets not held for sale to cus-
tomers, for investment or for use in a trade or business. Many of these
assets will be worth less than their adjusted bases because, although
they depreciate in fact, basis is not adjusted since depreciation deduc-
tions are not allowed. 126 Common examples of assets usually worth
less than adjusted basis are automobiles, furniture and boats. Other
items of nondeductible property, such as homes, might or might not
be worth less than their adjusted basis. Application of the formula set
forth above, without modification, would be improper because unreal-
ized nondeductible losses might be used to increase the adjusted basis
of appreciated items.
The proposed solution to problems of nondeductible property may
be illustrated by a simplified example of a marital community owning
only two assets-a house worth more than its adjusted basis and a
boat worth less:
Asset Adjusted Basis Value
House $20,000 $30,000
Boat 40,000 30,000
Total $60,000 $60,000
125. This proposed formula differs from results in recent trial court cases. See,
e.g., Beth W. Corp v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), in which
the basis of the community in a given property carried over to the spouse to whom
the property was awarded.
126. I.R.C. § 167 grants a depreciation deduction only for "property used in the
trade or business" or "property held for the production of income." See also I.R.C. § 183.
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If the marital community were to sell both assets, the community
would recognize a $10,000 taxable gain and a $10,000 nondeductible
loss. That result should not be changed merely because the property is
divided pursuant to a dissolution of the marriage. If partnership rules
are applied without modification, aggregate basis of $60,000 would
be divided between husband and wife. Thus, if the wife received the
house and the husband the boat, and if each sold his or her asset at
division-date value, neither would recognize a gain because each
would have a basis in the marital community of $30,000. If one as-
sumes that the value of the nondeductible loss property will never rise
above division-date value, the modification would be simple: Provide
that the adjusted basis of each nondeductible property asset, in com-
puting basis in the marital community, shall be the lesser of divi-
sion-date value or adjusted basis.127 Thus, the basis of the boat would
be reduced to $30,000 in computing an aggregate marital community
basis of $50,000. The wife's basis in the house would be $25,000 and
the husband's basis in the boat would be $25,000. If each asset were
sold at division-date value, total income recognized would be the same
as if both assets had been sold prior to dissolution.
This modification admittedly results in the loss of capital which
might be recoverable if the loss item appreciated after the division
date, but in most cases the problem will not exist. Where the problem
does exist, it can be solved by not recognizing the gain on the sale of
nondeductible items to the extent that the amount received on sale is
greater than division-date value but not greater than adjusted basis
just before the division. Specifically, if the boat in the above example
were subsequently sold by the husband for $30,000, he would recog-
nize a $5,000 gain; if it were sold for $40,000, he would still recog-
nize only a $5,000 gain; but if it were sold for $45,000, he would
recognize a $10,000 gain.
D. Problems Presented by Community Debts
Under the proposal here advanced, the assumption by one spouse
of community debts, or the award of property to one spouse subject to
127. This is a variation of the approach adopted in Rev. Rul. 74-347. 1974
INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6, which involved a taxable "unequal" division of joint
property. See Part IV supra.
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what was formerly a community debt, should ordinarily be treated as
a distribution to the other spouse of cash equal to one-half the amount
of the community debt.128 At the very least, exoneration from debts
should be treated in the same manner as the receipt of cash if the debt
is reflected by a lien on specific property awarded to the spouse who
agrees to pay the debt. Consider a marital community owning the fol-
lowing assets:
Asset Adjusted Basis Gross Value Lien Net Value
House $40,000 $ 60,000 $20,000 $40,000
Securities 30,000 40,000 0 40,000
Total $70,000 $100,000 $20,000 $80,000
Assume further that the husband receives the house, subject to the
lien, and that the wife receives the securities, in an equal division of
property pursuant to the dissolution of the marriage. It would be inap-
propriate simply to state that the wife's adjusted basis in the securities
is $35,000 (one-half of total adjusted basis). The wife, in such event,
would receive $10,000 of capital for which she pays nothing. There-
fore, the wife's adjusted basis in the securities should be reduced from
$35,000 to $25,000 and the husband's adjusted basis in the house
increased from $35,000 to $45,000. The propriety of this result is
supported by comparing the tax consequences of sales with and with-
out dissolution at division-date value. Absent dissolution, the total gain
on the sale of all assets would be $30,000. Each spouse would be tax-
able on half of such gain-$15,000 per spouse. Under the formula
set forth in this paragraph, the husband and wife would each recog-
nize a gain of $15,000 on the sale at division-date value of the house
and securities, if the house were awarded to the husband and the se-
curities were awarded to the wife pursuant to a dissolution of the mar-
riage. In sum, where debts are assumed by one spouse under these cir-
cumstances, one-half the debt should be treated as a distribution to
the "exonerated" spouse and as a capital investment by the other
spouse.
These same rules should also apply to general unsecured debts of
the community. For example, if the community owns assets with a
128. Rev. Rul. 318, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 362. The Ruling is based on I.R.C. § 752
and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (1956).
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basis of $5,000 and a value of $10,000, and if the community has
general unsecured indebtedness of $10,000, the wife should realize a
gain of $2,500 if she "walks away" in a division awarding all assets to
the husband, subject to all community debts. 12 9 The same result
would follow if the division were treated as unequal (wife transferring
her half of the assets to the husband in discharge of a marital obliga-
tion) and if the debt assumption by the husband were disregarded.
E. Unrealized Receivables and Appreciated Inventory
The dissolution of a partnership is not normally considered to be a
sale or exchange. Cash distributed pursuant to a partnership dissolu-
tion, therefore, first reduces a partner's basis in a partnership and is
taxable only to the extent that the amount distributed exceeds a part-
ner's basis in the partnership.1 30 Other items distributed are not con-
sidered to be sold or exchanged except to the extent that an interest in
an ordinary income type asset is exchanged for an interest in a capital
gain type asset. Thus, a partner whose basis in a partnership is
$10,000, and who receives cash of $8,000 and property worth
$10,000, will not be taxed on the distribution and will have an ad-
justed basis of $2,000 in the property received' 31-unless the dissolu-
tion involves an exchange of, for example, accounts receivable for
capital assets. To the extent of the exchange, the dissolution is tax-
able.1 32
To illustrate in a marriage dissolution, assume that a husband and
wife own the following assets as partners:
Asset Adjusted Basis Value
House $30,000 $ 50,000
Accounts Receivable 0 50,000
Total $30,000 $100,000
129. If the assets had been sold at value prior to division and the proceeds used
to pay the community debt, total gain would be $5,000; each spouse's share of the
gain would be $2,500 and neither spouse would end up with anything of value because
all the cash must be used to pay the community debt.
In the textual example, results are essentially the same. The wife is left with
nothing. The husband owns assets worth $10,000 but they are subject to an equal
amount of indebtedness.
130. I.R.C. § 731.
131. I.R.C. § 732(b).
132. I.R.C. §§ 731 & 751; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b) (1956). The Regulations do
not refer to partnerships having two partners only, but presumably include such
partnerships.
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If the house were sold and the accounts were collected before dissolu-
tion of the partnership, each partner would recognize capital gain of
$10,000 and ordinary income of $25,000. These results would not be
changed merely because the partnership is dissolved; likewise, they
should not be changed merely because the marriage relationship ter-
minates.
In the dissolution of a partnership, Section 751 and related sections
of the Code indicate that in the example just given, each spouse shall
be treated as having "sold" his or her interest in the partnership to the
extent that his or her share of "income" items is exchanged for the in-
terest of other partners in "property" items-and vice versa. Thus, if
in the example given, there is a division by which the wife receives the
house, and the husband the accounts receivable, the wife is deemed to
have sold her interest in accounts receivable (basis of zero and value
of $25,000), in return for her husband's interest in the house, recog-
nizing $25,000 of ordinary income. Her basis in the house becomes
$40,000; the distribution of the house to her is not a taxable event.
The husband is deemed to have sold his interest in the house (basis
$15,000 and value $25,000), recognizing a capital gain of $10,000
and obtaining a basis of $25,000 in the accounts receivable. Assuming
no change in values, the husband will recognize $25,000 of ordinary
income when the accounts are collected; the wife will realize a capital
gain of $10,000 when the house is sold. Thus,, tax consequences are
the same as if the marriage had not been dissolved. Only the timing is
different.
In some cases, of course, the rules proposed above will accelerate
the recognition of income and may impose hardship. Some hardships,
however, can be avoided by a division which provides for an equal
partition of income items. Such divisions need not be taxable events
because they do not involve the exchange of "property items," e.g.,
cash or house, in return for "income items," i.e., items listed as "un-
realized receivables" and "substantially appreciated inventory" in the
Code.133
The suggested formula may also be resisted by taxpayers because it
renders a division a taxable event to the extent that an interest in ordi-
133. Section 751 does not apply to any distribution to a partner of his or her
ratable share of appreciated inventory or unrealized receivables. Treas. Reg. §
1.75 l-1(b)(1)(ii).
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nary income type assets is exchanged for an interest in capital gain
type assets (and vice versa). The author doubts, however, whether ex-
isting uncertainty is preferable to the solutions proposed. Moreover.
the propriety of taxing all "income items" to the person who collects
those items is questionable. Such a rule would be inconsistent with our
present notions of community property law and would permit tax
avoidance by allocating "income items" to the spouse in the lower tax
bracket.
The formula suggested herein is also a necessary corollary to the
proposal that aggregate community basis be divided equally between
spouses. If that proposal is accepted, consistency requires that part-
nership-type treatment also be applied to divisions of income items.
F. More Assignment of Income Problems-Retirement Benefits
The rules relating to partnership taxation and dissolution are
readily applicable to assignment of income problems inherent in the
division of retirement benefits upon dissolution. It is likely that most
retirement benefits accounted for in a community property division are
"income items" which have not previously been taxed. Application
of the formula proposed above would cause one-half the division-date
value of those benefits to be taxed to the nonemployee spouse in the
year of division if she receives other property in return for her interest
in those benefits. The employee spouse would recognize a capital gain
to the extent that he surrenders an interest in appreciated capital as-
sets for his wife's interest in the retirement benefits. The suggested
formula creates a substantial acceleration in the realization of income
and creates an awkward "basis" in the employee's retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits present problems that are soluble only by legis-
lation. While it is assumed that divisions involving retirement benefits
can be tax-free, it is also further assumed, unrealistically, that the
nonemployee spouse will be taxed when benefits are received by the em-
ployee spouse.t34 To eliminate unacceptable acceleration in realiza-
tion of income under the formula, legislation should permit partners
to remove vested retirement benefits and other property of equal value
from the partnership equation. Thus, if vested pension rights have a
134. See Victor, Divorce and Deferred Compensation Arrangements, U. So. CAL.
1972 TAX INST. 609; text accompanying note 88 supra.
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present basis of zero and a present value of $50,000, other property
of equal value could be awarded to the nonemployee spouse in return
for his or her interest in the pension. The nonemployee spouse would
then take the other property at the marital community's adjusted
basis. Only the employee spouse would recognize income as the retire-
ment benefits are collected. This solution would cause a dispropor-
tionate share of the tax burden to fall upon the employee spouse, but
it would prevent premature realization of income and problems inci-
dental to such realization. A similar solution could, of course, be ap-
plied to all income items, but its application to items such as accounts
receivable would lead to tax avoidance for the reasons already dis-
cussed. 135
G. Unequal Divisions and Sales
Under the partnership rules, an unequal division, or a sale, should
be treated as a transaction involving two separate and distinct steps:
(1) an equal division subject to the rules proposed in Parts
VI-A through F, supra, followed by (2) a sale of designated
items by one spouse to the other for the separate cash or property of
the other, or a transfer of property in discharge of a marital obliga-
tion. 136 Under such a rule, the separation contract or dissolution de-
cree should specify the assets to be received by each spouse in the
equal division as well as the items transferred or sold after such a divi-
sion.
The simplicity and equity of such a solution may be illustrated by
an example. Assume that a husband and wife own as community
property the following:
Asset Adjusted Basis Fair Market Value
House $30,000 $ 75,000
Securities 20,000 25,000
Total $50,000 $100,000
Regardless of whether the dissolution involves a "sale" or an "un-
equal" division, the first step should treat the dissolution as an equal
135. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
136. See Part III-B supra.
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division, with the agreement or decree specifying the property to be
awarded to each spouse. If the husband is to receive the securities and
the wife is to receive the house, the husband, in the first step, should
receive one-third ($25,000 worth) of the house and all the securities.
The basis of each spouse in assets received by him or her would be
half of the aggregate community basis, allocated among assets in ac-
cordance with market values. Results, in tabular form, can be ex-
pressed as follows:
Asset Adjusted Basis Fair Market Value
Securities (husband) $12,500 $25,000
One-third house (husband) 12,500 25,000
Two-thirds house (wife) 25,000 50,000
Once these determinations are made, further tax consequences fol-
lowing from "inequality" of division or from categorization of the di-
vision as a "sale" are easily ascertained. Thus, because the division is
unequal in fact, the husband realizes a capital gain of $12,500 under
accepted principles since he is deemed to have transferred his share of
the house in satisfaction of his marital obligations. The wife would
have no income and would increase her basis in the house from
$25,000 to $50,000. Precisely the same results would follow if the
husband were to receive a (separate property) note from his wife in
the amount of $25,000 in order to "equalize the division." In the first
instance the division was "unequal." In the second instance the hus-
band "sold" his interest in the house to the wife. 137
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clearly not enough simply to say that "equal divisions" of
community "property" are not taxable events. We have seen that what
may appear to be an equal division may in fact be a taxable "sale." It
is obvious that not all "divisions" are "equal" and that "property" for
state law purposes may not be "property" for federal income tax pur-
poses. Thus, many property settlements are taxable in whole or in part
even if the settlements involve only community property. This article
137. Although no cases discuss the issue, it appears that nonvested retirement
benefits are not deemed property for federal tax purposes and, therefore, are not in
the "equation" anyway.
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has considered the ancillary tax problems created by nontaxable divi-
sions and the tax consequences of settlements taxable in whole or in
part. We have seen that many questions remain unanswered and al-
though other questions have been answered on a piecemeal basis, the
development of the law has not been a niodel of rationality or cohe-
siveness.
It is sensible to consider a marriage in a community property state
to be a de facto partnership for tax purposes. Once this proposition is
accepted, the tax consequences of a property settlement pursuant to
the dissolution of such a marriage are easily predictable and one need
pay special attention only to modifications or adjustments required by
the unique character of property owned by marital communities, such
as nondeductible property and pension rights.
Taxpayers are entitled to certainty in negotiating property settle-
ments. No such certainty exists at present. The occasional hardship
that may result from application of partnership rules to marital rela-
tionships, e.g., acceleration of income, would be more than offset by
the fact that husbands, wives and their counsel could arrange dissolu-
tion settlements with confidence as to the resulting federal tax conse-
quences.
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